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B Proof of Mutual Exclusion Server
The guarantee properties of pair 
 are invariant properties of the server process and do not
depend on the environment at all
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We now present a lemma that will be used in the last two proofs
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We next show that the server satises modied relyguarantee pair 
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Finally we prove that the server satises modied relyguarantee pair 


Server int s tok init process id sc process id sout process id sin
initially
int stok  
senttoks sout  s tok init
boolean s hungry  false
boolean s clienttok  false
actions
 s hungry   s clienttok  sc sreq 
rcv REQ from sc
s hungry true
 s hungry  sin stok
rcv TOK from sin
stok		
send TOK to sout
stok
 

s hungry  sin stok
rcv TOK from sin
stok		
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s hungry false
s clienttok true
s clienttok  sc stok 
rcv TOK from sc
stok		
send TOK to sout
stok
 

s clienttok false
Client process id cs
initially
int ctok  
boolean c sent req  false
boolean c crit  false
boolean c terminated false
actions
 c sent req   c crit
c terminated true
 c sent req   c crit   c terminated
send REQmy id to cs
c sent req true
c sent req  cs ctok
rcv TOK
ctok		
c sent req false
c crit true
begin critical
c crit
end critical
c crit false
send TOK to cs
ctok
 


A Algorithm for Mutual Exclusion
In this section we give the algorithms for both the clients and the server The program for
initializing and connecting these components is not given here for the sake of brevity
Message Type
enum TOK REQ MSG
Server int s	tok	init process	id client	id
process	id s	out process	id s	in
 
for int i is	tok	init i

send TOK to s	out
int s	tok  
MSG m
repeat
m  receive MSG where MSGREQ  sourceclient	id

 MSGTOK  sources	in

if mREQ
 
receive MSG where MSGTOK  sources	in

send TOK to client	id
m  receive MSG where MSGTOK
while m sourceclient	id
  m sources	in
send TOK to s	out
m  receive MSG where MSGTOK

send TOK to s	out

else  mTOK
send TOK s	out

end repeat

Client process	id server	id
 
int c	tok  
repeat
non	critical

send REQ to server	id
receive MSG where MSGTOK
c	tok
begin	critical

end	critical

send TOK to server	id
c	tok
end repeat

Next we give the algorithm as expressed by a series of guarded commands
Message Types
int TOK
process id REQ

 Conclusions
The emphasis of this approach is on the decomposition of a distributed program into individual
processes and on the independent specication and verication of each of these processes These
specications are then composed according to the architecture 
ie according to how these processes
are plugged together yielding a global program property The properties of the computation as
a whole are implied by this global program property
The principal strength of the modied relyguarantee specication notation we propose is the
ability to specify and verify processes in isolation By combining the ability to rely on progress
properties of the environment while restricting attention to local properties we obtain a powerful
specication construct and yet a simple corresponding proof methodology

 Discussion
Evaluation The rst example illustrates the principal strength of this approach Each process
type is specied implemented and veried in isolation The program is then demonstrated to meet
the mutual exclusion specication by considering only the composition of modied relyguarantee
clauses and by creating an implication ladder Nothing more than the specications of the client
and server processes the architecture of their interconnection and the channel properties given
in  are needed in this phase of program verication
The second example illustrates the principal shortcoming of this approach The specication
of this problem involves dening a tree of processes This is a global property which cannot be
directly expressed as a conjunction of local properties For this reason the proof cannot be directly
built as an implication ladder of modied relyguarantee properties The principal problem with
the second example is that the exact topology of the tree of processes in the computation is non
deterministic If the algorithm were modied to use a xed tree we could prove its correctness
without a global proof
Nevertheless this specication remains a useful construct in particular as a precise denition
of the obligation of the programmer implementing the gossip processes The hard part of the
larger proof involving global properties in addition to modied relyguarantee clauses requires
some sophistication but the specication of the individual process can still be expressed as mod
ied relyguarantee clauses providing a clear contract between the validation argument and the
implementation
Reusability Because each process is veried in isolation the code and proof for a process can
be easily reused in another computation if the specication is appropriate For example for the
mutual exclusion example a new architecture consisting of a single central server with a collection
of clients can be implemented by designing a new server processes but keeping the client process
presented in this paper
Since the proof that a process meets its specication is often the hardest part of these proofs

compared to the proof that the rely clauses are all program properties for example this kind
of proof reuse is important Reusing the proof in this fashion results in a system that has been
formally proven to be correct while keeping the additional proof obligation manageable
Abstraction Modied relyguarantee pairs also provide a clear and precise denition of the
behavior of the environment of a process They can be used as interface specications for channels
that lead to the environment For instance suppose we have a distributed computation that
implements a distributed database A user sends queries to the database by sending messages
on channels to a local process that is connected to the distributed database A user of the
database only requires that the local process eventually responds to each query The details of
the computation that implements the database should be completely transparent to the user
Such a specication can be easily given using modied relyguarantee pairs

Possible Congurations The following invariant states the possible congurations of the
graph Every process has value  or there is a process that has value  whose children in the
tree T all have value 
h p  pval  i 
 h u  
uval    h v  
v u  RT  vval  ii 

 Process Properties
The following local properties assert that a process will complete certain actions from a given
state no matter what the process is composed with
Broadcast After the rst message has been received a process will send messages to all its
neighbors except the process from which it received the rst message

uval    h u  u nbr v  
v  uparent   sent
msgu v  i 

Messages are received Every delivered message received eventually

 del
msgw u    
 rcv
msgw u   

Termination If all neighboring processes deliver a message then eventually the algorithm will
terminate
h u  u nbr v   del
msgv u  i  
uval   

 Transient Properties
Growing tree A process that has value  that has a neighbor with value  will eventually
change its value
h u v  u nbr v  transient
uval    vval  i 

Shrinking tree A process that has value  and whose children in the tree have value 
will eventually have value 
h u  transient
uval    h v  u nbr v  vval  i  h v  
v u  RT  vval  ii


  Proof
The correctness of the process properties given above can be conrmed from the text of the
program These properties are entirely local to the processes and so the validation can be carried
out in isolation The correctness of the computation as a whole however requires the validation of
the global invariants and the global transient properties These properties can not be established
by an implication ladder of modied relyguarantee properties because they cannot be expressed
as the conjunction of local properties
The complete proof for this algorithm can be found in  MSC

Initiator
 
myid  my process id
neighborhood  set of process	ids of neighbors
 val  
foreach p in neighborhood
send myid to p
foreach p in neighborhood
receive p
 val  

Gossip
 
myid  my process id
neighborhood  set of process	ids of neighbors
 val  
receive parent
 val  
foreach p in neighborhood  parent
send myid to p
foreach p in neighborhood  parent
receive p
send myid to parent
 val  

  Invariants Process Properties and Transient Properties
We dene the following  graphs
T  
fp  pval    pg fp  
pval    
p  I  
p pparentg 

T

 
fp  pval    pg fp  
pval    
p  I  
p pparentg 

The tree T

is clearly a subtree of T  since RT

 RT 
 Global Invariants
Messages There is at most one message sent on a channel
h u v  u nbr v   sent
msgu v 	 i 

Tree of processes The subgraph participating in the gossip algorithm is a tree and a process
sends a message only after it is part of the tree
T is a tree  h u v   sent
msgu v   u  LT i 
	
Tree of ones The subgraph of processes that have value  form a tree Note that the
subgraph of  processes rst grows and then shrinks Also if a process has value  all its
children in the tree have value 
T

is a tree  h p  pval   h q  
q p  RT  qval  ii 
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 Second Example Synchronization With Gossip
This section describes the gossip algorithm gives a pseudocode implementation of a gossip process
and species the behaviour of this process using modied relyguarantee For the sake of brevity
the complete proof of correctness is not given
The gossip algorithm can be used to synchronize a collection of processes Two processes are
considered to be neighbours if they are connected by a channel There is a special process that
initiates the gossip algorithm The system is described by an undirected graph G  
VE where
V is the set of processes and E is the set of channels I the initiator process is considered to be
part of the graph Since the graph is undirected and connected there is a path between any pair
of processes Let a nbr b be the relation a and b are neighbours Let R
p q be dened as q
and L
p q be p
  Specications
 Safety
Synchronization We must ensure that when the initiator receives a message from all its neigh
bors all processes in V have completed the gossip algorithm
h u  u nbr I   sent
msgu I  i  h u  u has completed the gossip algorithmi 

 Progress
Completion The only progress requirement is that after the initiator sends a message to all
its neighbors it eventually receives a message from all its neighbors
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  sent
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  rcv
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  Algorithm
 Pseudocode
Message Type
PROCESS	ID

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Server Rely 
	 is a Program Property We introduce the notation soutout to mean the
out process of ss out process By extension sout
k
is the out process that is k hops away from s
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Informal Proof Description Specication pair 
 relies only on the environment satisfying
invariant
true  and so represents the invariants of the server process independent of the envi
ronment It follows directly from the initial conditions 
the channels are all empty and the server
holds stok init tokens and the annotation of the server algorithm 

Specication pair 
	 for the server says that if the client eventually returns all the tokens
sent to it then all the tokens sent to the server are eventually passed on to the next server This
follows from the server algorithm since it sends tokens returned by the client directly on to the
next server
Specication pair 
 for the server says that if the environment eventually returns all the
tokens that are sent to it then the server will eventually satisify 
with tokens all the requests
sent to it That the server receives all requests sent to it follows from the fact that the server
does not suspend forever which in turn follows from the fact that received requests are eventually
satised A server eventually satises an outstanding request because tokens are continuously
circulating and a hungry server passes the next token on to its client
Formal Proof The formal proof for the server follows the pattern demonstrated in the previous
section with the client process The proof is included in the appendix
  Proof of Program Specication
 Composition
We establish the safety and progress requirements given by  	 and  by showing that the
guarantee clauses are invariant properties of the computation given the ring architecture described
in the introduction That is we show that each rely clause is an invariant property of the
computation This is done either directly or by establishing that the rely clause is implied by a
guarantee clause whose rely has already been shown to be program property Notice that these
proof obligations are dictated by the architecture in question a ring of servers each with a single
client 
ie the guarantee clauses of all neighbours with channels to a process must imply the rely
clause of the process By the main theorem of modied relyguarantees this establishes the
conjuntion of the guarantee clauses as a property of the program
Server Rely 
 is a Program Property Trivial since this rely is invariant
true 

Client Rely 
 is a Program Property Trivial since this rely is invariant
true 

Client Rely 
 is a Program Property
true
 f Servers relyguarantee 
 g
h c  c  C   sent
tokcs c 	  del
reqc csi
 f  g

Informal Proof Description Specication pair 
 relies only on the environment satisfying
true and so represents the invariants of the client process independent of the environment It
follows directly from the initial conditions 
the channels are all empty and the client holds no
tokens and the annotation of the client algorithm 

Specication pair 
 for the client says that if the number of tokens delivered to the client
from the environment is bounded by the number of requests sent by the client then the client
will eventually return all the tokens delivered to it This follows directly from the algorithm of
the client which waits for a token to arrive after every request it sends The tokens received are
returned immediately 
that is the critical section of a client is nite
Formal Proof Again the guarantee properties of 
 are invariant properties of the client
process
invariant
ctok 
P
e cE
 rcv
toke c
P
e cE
 sent
tokc e
 f  g
invariant
true 
Also
invariant
ctok  ord
ccrit
 f  g
invariant
true 
And nally
h e k  e  cE  k  IN   rcv
toke c  k    sent
tokc e  ki
 f client algorithm g
invariant
true 
We next prove the client satises relyguarantee pair 

h e k  e  cE  k  IN   del
toke c  k    rcv
toke c  ki
 f calculus  and  g
h e  e  cE  
e ctok  inc  rcv
toke ci
 f client algorithm g
h e  e  cE  
e ctok  
e ctok  csent reqi
 f calculus g
invariant
h e  e  cE  
e ctok csent reqi
 f  g
invariant
h e  e  cE  
e ctok  rcv
toke c   sent
reqc ei
 f calculus g
invariant
h e  e  cE   del
toke c 	  sent
reqc ei

 Proof of Server
In this section we prove that the algorithm given for the server in Section  meets the specication
given by the modied relyguarantee pairs 
 
	 and 
 in Section 

 Specications
Each process is specied by a collection of modied relyguarantee pairs These pairs can be seen
as a processs obligation when placed in an appropriate environment
Server There are two processes in a servers 
s incoming environment a client 
sc  C and
another server 
sin  S Thus for a server s

E  fsc sing There are two processes in a
servers 
s outgoing environment the same client 
sc  C and a server 
sout  S Thus for
a server s

E  fsc soutg
A server does not create nor destroy tokens Also a server does not send more tokens to its client
than requested
l invariant
true 
k invariant
 sent
toks sc 	  del
reqsc s 
invariant
stok  stok init
P
e s

E
 sent
toks e 
P
e s
 
E
 rcv
toke s m 

If its client eventually returns all tokens it is sent a server eventually passes all tokens it receives
on to the next server
l h k  k  IN   sent
toks sc  k    del
toksc s  ki
k h k  k  IN   del
toksin s  k    sent
toks sout  k  stok initi m 
	
If its client eventually returns all tokens it is sent and the tokens that are passed on to the next
server eventually return a server eventually satises all requests for tokens
l h k  k  IN   sent
toks sc  k    del
toksc s  ki 
h k  k  IN   sent
toks sout  k    del
toksin s  k  tok init stok initi
k h k  k  IN   del
reqsc s  k    sent
toks sc  ki m 

Client
A client does not create nor destroy tokens nor does it enter its critical section without holding
a token A client eventually returns all tokens it is sent
l invariant
true 
k invariant
ctok 
P
e cE
 rcv
toke c
P
e cE
 sent
tokc e 
invariant
ctok  ord
ccrit 
h e k  e  cE  k  IN   rcv
toke c  k    sent
tokc e  ki m 

If its server does not send more tokens than requested all tokens that are delivered are eventually
received
l invariant
h e  e  cE   del
toke c 	  sent
reqc ei
k h e k  e  cE  k  IN   del
toke c  k    rcv
toke c  ki m 

 Proof of Client
In this section we prove that the algorithm given for the client in Section  meets the specication
given by the modied relyguarantee pairs 
 and 
 in Section 

 s hungry   s clienttok  sc sreq 
inc rcvreqsc s  s hungry
 s hungry  sin stok
inc rcvtoksin s  inc senttoks sout
s hungry  sin stok
inc rcvtoksin s  inc senttoks sc   s hungry  s clienttok
s clienttok  sc stok 
inc rcvtoksc s  inc senttoks sout   s clienttok
Client process id cs
initially
ctok  
c sent req  false
c crit  false
c terminated false
actions
 c sent req   c crit
c terminated
 c sent req   c crit   c terminated
inc sentreqc cs  c sent req
c sent req  cs ctok
inc rcvtokcs c  inc ctok   c sent req  c crit
c crit
inc senttokc cs  dec ctok   c crit
Notice that the pseudocode given in Appendix A can be easily shown to be an implementation
of this algorithm by annotating the program with the above assertions
 Process Properties and Invariants
 Invariants
The following invariants can be easily established
Server
stok  stok init
X
e s

E
 sent
toks e 
X
e s
 
E
 rcv
toke s 

 rcv
toksin s   sent
toks sout stok init ord
sclienttok 

 sent
toks sc   rcv
toksc s  ord
sclienttok 

 rcv
reqsc s   sent
toks sc  ord
shungry 

Client
ctok   rcv
tokcs c  sent
tokc cs 

ctok  ord
ccrit 

 sent
reqc cs   rcv
tokcs c  ord
csent req 


p can send messages When no distinction between these two sets is needed 
since they are the
same we use pE
Channels are denoted by the triple 
msg p p where msg is the type of the messages on the
channel p is the sender and p is the receiver
In this algorithm there are  kinds of messages tokens 
denoted tok and requests for tokens

denoted req In addition tok init denotes the initial number of tokens in the system The
number of tokens held by a process p is given by ptok and the number of tokens in a channel
between processes p and q is 
p qtok
 Specications
 Safety
Conservation of Tokens Tokens can neither be created nor destroyed Thus at any moment
in the computation the total number of tokens in the system is the same as it was at the beginning
of the computation
X
s S

stok 
s souttok 
X
c C

ctok 
cs ctok 
c cstok  tok init 

Necessity of Tokens Clients enter their critical section only if they hold a token
h c  c  C  ccrit 
ctok  i 
	
ccrit indicates whether or not the client is executing its critical section
 Progress
Request Satisfaction If a client makes a request then eventually that client receives a token
h c k  c  C  k  IN   sent
reqc cs  k    rcv
tokcs c  ki 

 Algorithm
We present the algorithm as an action system with pre and post conditions For a pseudocode
implementation please refer to the appendix We associate each action 
which is considered to
be atomic since no actions causing suspension are permitted with its postcondition Variables
not explicitly mentioned in the postcondition are not modied by an action We also make use
of the shorthand inc 
and dec  to abbreviate an integer increment 
and decrement to a ghost
variable
Server int s tok init process id sc process id sout process id sin
initially
int stok  
senttoks sout  s tok init
boolean s hungry  false
boolean s clienttok  false
actions

 Channel Properties
In addition our denition of the model of computation gives the following properties on the ghost
variables characterizing channels
sent
c  del
c 

del
c  rcv
c 

sent
c  k   del
c  k 

 First Example Mutual Exclusion in a Ring
This section describes a solution to the mutual exclusion problem using a xed number of tokens
and a ring of servers responsible for distributing tokens to clients waiting to enter their critical
section Pictorially the topology of the problem is represented in Figure 
.
.
.
.  .  .
client
server
token
Figure  Clients Communicate with a Ring of Servers
The system contains N clients N servers and K tokens Initially one of the servers holds all
the tokens The tokens circulate continuously around the ring A client is allowed to enter its
critical section only if it holds a token Because tokens can neither be created nor destroyed this
ensures that at any one time there are at most K clients in their critical sections
 Notation
We use S to denote the set of servers and s to denote a particular server process Similarly C
denotes the set of clients and c denotes a particular client process Thus s  S c  C and
jSj  jCj  N  We use p

E to denote the sets of processes which form ps incoming environment
That is p

E is the set of processes which can send messages to p We use p

E to denote the sets
of processes which form ps outgoing environment That is p

E is the set of processes to which

 a message that is sent will be received eventually
In our model progress properties are derived from a single property transient
Denition  
transient Given predicate p transientp holds for a program P just when all
executions of P which include a state where p holds also include a later state in which p is false
If p is always false then transientp holds
Theorem  
Compositionality Let lR k Gm be a property of program P 
 Then lR k Gm is a
property of P k Q for any program Q

Proof The proof is obtained by structural induction on properties
We are simpler than TLA  Lam since our model can be expressed using TLA and there are
properties of TLA we cannot express
Restricting safety properties in this way permits us to establish the following theorem
Theorem  
Composing Safety Properties Let lR

k G

m     lR
n
k G
n
m be a collection of
modied relyguarantee properties of a program that relies on property R and let all the properties
be safety properties
 Let RR

     R
n
hold initially and assume that for all k
R  h j  j  k  G
j
i  R
k
holds
 Then
lR k h j  R
j
 G
j
im
is a property of the system

Proof The proof is obtained by induction on the sequence of states in the computation
 Some more properties
We now dene certain properties that are commonly used in proofs of distributed systems
Denition  
stable Safety property stablep holds for a program if once p becomes true it
remains true from that point on
stablep

 p next p
Denition  
invariant Safety property invariantp holds for a program if p holds initially
and if p remains true for the entire computation
invariantp

 initiallyp  stablep
Denition  
leadsto Progress property p   q 
pronounced leadsto holds for a program
if once p becomes true q holds eventually in the computation
p   q

 invariant
p transient
q
Denition 	 
toalways Progress property p  q 
pronounced toalways holds for a pro
gram if p   q and if q is stable
p  q

 p   q  stableq
	
Modied RelyGuarantee We now make use of relyguarantee properties with the following
restriction clauses in the relyguarantee property can refer only to local variables in the process
The denition remains the same
lR k GmP  h E  E is a legal environment for P  R
E k P  G
E k P i
Relyguarantee properties which conform to this restriction aremodied relyguarantee properties
Observe that the implication can be established without considering all legal environments since
the properties R and G only refer to local variables of P  We will present a theorem which allows
us to restate the above denition as
lR k GmP  RP  GP
Theorem  
Composition Theorem Let lR

k G

m     lR
n
k G
n
m be a collection of modied
relyguarantee properties of a program that relies on property R
 Assume that for all k
R  h j  j  k  R
j
 G
j
i  R
k
holds
 Then
lR k h i  R
i
 G
i
im
is a property of the program

Proof The proof is obtained by induction on i
 Program Properties
The initial state of a program is captured by the predicate initially initiallyp is true for a program
P if the predicate p holds initially
A safety property is one that species that the program never executes erroneously Examples
of safety properties are
 variable x is always nonnegative
 a message is received only if it has been sent
In our model safety properties are derived from a single relation next 
Denition  
next Given predicates p and q the property p next q holds for program P just
when execution of a single step of P from any state that satises p results in a state that satises
q Observe that since a program can always do nothing if p next q holds for a process P  then
p q must be true
A progress property is one that species that the program eventually performs the computation
we desire Examples of progress properties are
 variable x will become positive eventually

Notation A predicate is a set of states Predicates can also be dened to be the characteristic
function of the set of states they represent Examples of predicates are the set of possible initial
states and nal states of a computation 
the preconditions and postconditions of  Hoa
A property is a set of program executions that is a set of sequences of states Like predicates
properties can be dened to be the characteristic function of the corresponding set of states
Examples of program properties are the unless and ensures properties of UNITY  CM The
modied relyguarantee specication statement presented here is another example of a program
property
Our proof format is from  DS We denote quantication using the expression
hQ x  rx  txi
where Q is a quantier such as  x is an unordered list of identier names 
dummies rx 
the
range is a predicate and tx 
the term is an expression of the appropriate type When rx is
true everywhere or understood we omit the range and write the quantication as
hQ x  txi 
A process can be represented in various ways
 A sequential program with sends and receives on channels
 A set of actions guarded with boolean expressions written as G
i
 S
i
 An action is said
to be enabled when its guard is true Since the set of actions represents a single thread of
control any pair of guards must be mutually exclusive
 Proof Methodology
We discuss compositionality of proofs and show how to use it with basic properties about safety
and progress
 Compositionality
The key to compositional proofs is local reasoning we would like to be able to prove important
properties about a process without examining its environment in detail This not only simplies
the proof of the properties in question but it also enables us to reuse the properties of the process
when it is composed with dierent environments
Guarantee A guarantee property as dened in  Cha is an example of an anycomponent
property used to reason about the parallel composition of a process with another For a process
P  a guarantee property 
RG is dened as follows

RGP  h E  E is a legal environment for P  R
E k P   G
E k P i

RG holds for P just when given any legal environment E for P  when R holds for E k P then
G holds for E k P  The problem with using such a exible denition is that both R and G can
refer to variables that are global to the computation As a result we have to consider all legal
environments to establish such a guarantee property

in a distributed system by the guarantees it makes on its behavior under assumptions about its
environment We propose such a specication construct based on relyguarantee  AL pairs and
allcomponent and anycomponent properties for distributed systems  Cha This construct is
an extension of the former in that the rely clause is not restricted to safety properties at the
cost of a more complicated proof methodology it is a restriction on the latter in that only local
properties of components are used with the benet that component validations can be carried
out in complete isolation 
and hence are reusable
This paper denes the proposed specication construct and the derives the related composition
theorem The methodology is explored by specifying and validating two synchronization problems
The rst demonstrates the strengths of the approach in independent component analysis and proof
reuse The second quanties the limits of the expressivity of our restricted specication construct
 Execution Model
In this section we describe an execution model for concurrent programs This model is suitable
for describing looselycoupled distributed applications The model serves as a basis for reasoning
about the correctness of these applications and their compositions
Processes A process is a unit of protection ie it does not share variables with any other
process in the computation For simplicity a process contains a single thread of execution All
the results presented here can be extended to multithreaded processes without signicant change
The state of a process is embodied in the values of its variables including its program counter
A process cannot directly modify the states of other processes interaction between processes is
achieved by the exchange of messages A program is a nite collection of processes The execution
of a program can be described using a sequence of states where the next state is obtained by the
execution of a single step of the program
Channels Processes communicate by sending messages on channels A channel is a rstin
rstout message buer The process that inserts messages into the channel is known as the
sender  and the process that removes messages from the buer is known as the receiver  We
restrict processes to those in which channels have only a single sender and a single receiver
Channels are reliable in that no messages are lost or duplicated Sends on channels never block
and receives block only if there are no pending messages
The state of a channel c is characterized by four ghost variables
  sent
c is the number of messages inserted into the channel by the sender
  rcv
c is the number of messages removed from the channel by the receiver
  del
c is the number of messages that have been delivered by the underlying message
passing system to the receiver
 hist
c is the sequence of messages that have been sent on the channel

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Abstract
We present a specication notation for components of concurrent systems and an accom
panying proof methodology for reasong about the composition of these components The
specication construct is motivated by relyguarantee pairs and by anycomponent program
properties The proof technique is based on an implication ladder and on two basic proper
ties from which more complex properties are derived Two examples illustrate the simplicity
and compositionality of the model and demonstrate how the model can be used to create
structured and reusable proofs of distributed systems
Key words Specications Composition Distributed Systems RelyGuarantee
	 Introduction
Driven by demands for priceperformance enhanced communication reactivity and robustness
there has been a recent proliferation of looselycoupled distributed systems as reected in the
emergence of standards such as CORBA  Obj	 and technologies such as Java  GJS and the
Web  BLCGP These systems exhibit a higher degree of heterogeneity than has been typical
in the past We anticipate cooperating processes to be developed by dierent authors at dierent
times and to be bound dynamically at runtime  CR For this reason it will be important for
an application developer to be able to specify and validate each component in a distributed system
in isolation and then reason about the correctness of the resulting computation as processes are
composed
Much as a procedure in a sequential program can be specied by the guarantees it makes
on its behavior under assumptions about its initial state we would like to specify a process
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